Blurts & Spasms

In answer to the Quora question: "Immanuel Kant argues that it is always immoral to lie what is a situation where it would be immoral to tell the truth?"

Thanks for the A2A.

I believe Kant would say that this perceived dilemma is grounded in conflating "the good" with "the right," that is, sidestepping categorical imperatives that have universal moral objectivity (i.e. "the right," or something which is intrinsically good without qualification) with hypothetical imperatives that are intrinsically subjective (i.e. "the good," or something which is situationally advantageous). Thus what one person perceives as good for themselves isn't necessarily the morally right thing to do, and the morally right thing to do does not always result in what is good for the person doing it; in this respect moral duty supersedes self-interest. As a result Kant felt a normative, rules-based system of ethics was achievable (in contrast to moral relativism, pragmatism, or consequentialism).

Initially, this kinds of makes sense, especially since the primary absolute in Kant's moral system was good will towards all of humanity, which could therefore be the basis of all law, and a reason for conformance to that law. Human beings are not just a means, he argued, they are an end in and of themselves. This principle is, in fact, reflected in much of the modern formation of law (consider that any conception of basic human rights or civil liberties captures this moral universality). So far so good.

Where his reasoning begins to break down, however, is in how Kant believed categorical imperatives should be derived. His persisting error was that "pure practical reason" was the only reliable method. And, as you have pointed out in your question, Kant's reliance on his own "pure practical reason" regarding lying led him to an untenable conclusion: that all lying was immoral. For him, there was no conceivable qualification, exception or variation to this conclusion. And that is clearly a problem, in that he did not consider values hierarchies in his calculations (as others who have posted answers in this thread - about hiding Jews from Nazis, for example - have demonstrated). This does not necessarily mean that pragmatism or relativism are correct, but that Kant had invested in a faulty method of discerning absolutes.

So while many people (including philosophers throughout history) would agree that there are moral absolutes, they might disagree about how to arrive at them - and with Kant's hyperrational and somewhat egotistical method of derivation. I myself am a fan of virtue ethics, but also agree that certain virtues are both universal and absolute, and that our values hierarchies must cascade down from those. In other words, that ethics cannot be inverted or situationalized for the convenience of self-interest or expediency, and that Kant's differentiation of "the right" and "the good" can and should still be supported. With some degree of irony it can be noted that Kant himself believed cultivating virtues that supported moral imperatives was extremely important - but he did not recognize that his own moral reasoning may have issued from precisely this same process. In any case, I hope I have adequately described how Kant could both be correct in some of his primary postulations, and mistaken in his secondary assumptions and applications.

My 2 cents.