Thanks for the question. Simply put: Quine’s critique tends to support and even exemplify scientism, rather than undermine it. He is basically saying that there isn’t really any kind of “so-called knowledge” that can’t be empirically verified, implying that a scientific approach is humanity’s best avenue for pursuing knowledge. That is, if our insights lack predictive efficacy, then maybe we don’t really “know” what we think we do. We might call this assertion an “a posteriori epistemic bias,” an example of postmodern rejection of all other conceptions, traditions or forms of knowledge. Quine seems to believe this is “pragmatism,” but I would reject that characterization.
My 2 cents.
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